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 Interest Rate Trends in a Global Context 
Abstract 
Long-term interest rates have been falling globally since the early 1980s and have reached 
historically low levels. Past forecasts largely missed this secular decline. This paper reviews 
methodologies for making long-term interest rate projections. We synthesize results from 
studies that use long historical series and cross-country data to estimate the trend and 
decompose it into components. We then construct a set of economic indicators that are 
potentially useful in interest rate forecasting. We add international, forward-looking economic 
indicators as explanatory variables in a standard macrofinance forecasting model. We find that 
the model with international variables can outperform the other models by better tracking the 
falling trajectory of United States interest rates in the post-2008 period, a trend missed by 
domestic variables. Further, we find that global economic indicators, especially the composite 
leading indicator for the European Union, are capable of accounting for a large portion of yield 
variance not only in the U.S. but in other advanced economies as well. 
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1. Introduction 
Social Security Trust Fund projections rely on assumptions about the long-run interest 
rate. Interest rates are used to discount the benefits stream, to assess fiscal sustainability, and 
to project income and outlays of the trust funds. It is well known that interest rates have fallen 
steadily since the early 1980s in advanced economies, including the United States. Past 
forecasts largely missed this global, secular decline in interest rates and tended to predict rate 
reversals toward the long-run historical average year after year. 
Yield curves capture rates of return for assets with different maturities. The interest 
rates’ term structures (the return on long- relative to short-run assets) reflects the market 
response to changing economic conditions in the U.S. and the rest of the world at different 
horizons. As we show below, some factors move the entire yield curve, while others play a 
more important role at short relative to long horizons.  
This project has two major objectives. First, we review empirical studies on the global 
component of interest rates and provide a synthesis of methodologies that use cross-country 
data for U.S. interest rate forecasting. Second, we provide an organizing framework for 
analyzing influences of domestic and global factors on the dynamics of U.S. interest rates. 
Ultimately, our analysis will improve our understanding of the factors that drive long-run 
interest rates and will inform us of the key variables — domestic and foreign — that can be 
used to forecast rates going forward. 
We find that two methodologies are potentially useful for constructing long-range 
interest rate projections: semi-structural methods of interest rate trend decomposition and 
standard statistical forecasting models with an extended set of explanatory variables, including 
forward-looking economic indicators. These methodologies use different data and samples, 
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and they provide complementary pieces of information. We deploy both of these methods to 
examine the determinants of U.S. interest rates. 
We perform a decomposition of the long-run nominal interest rate over the period 1981 
to 2019 under the restriction of long-run inflation neutrality. Three variables, the earnings-price 
ratio of the stock market, the weighted average of past and forecasted consumption growth, 
and year-on-year productivity growth, explain 87% of variation in the 10-year real rate. The 
relative importance of the various macroeconomic determinants changes over time, with the 
earnings-price ratio mattering most in the 1981 to 1988 period and consumption growth most 
significant following recessions. 
We add international, forward-looking economic indicators as explanatory variables in a 
standard macrofinance forecasting model. We find that the model with international variables 
can outperform the other models by better tracking the falling trajectory of U.S. interest rates in 
the post-2008 period, a trend missed by domestic variables. Further, we find that global 
economic indicators, especially the composite leading indicator for the European Union, are 
capable of accounting for a large portion of yield variance not only in the U.S. but in other 
advanced economies as well. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2  provides a motivation for the set of 
macroeconomic variables — domestic and global — that we argue could be incorporated in 
forecasting models of the interest rate. Section 3 surveys current methodologies for forecasting 
interest rates and places our approach in the context of the literature. Our analysis of interest 
rates and their connection to macroeconomic trends is presented in Section 4.  Section 5 
concludes.  
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2.  Drivers of long-run interest rates 
In equilibrium, the real interest rate is jointly determined by the supply of saving and the 
demand for investment.  All else equal, conditions that induce households to set aside more 
income today and to postpone consumption for later will increase the supply of saving and shift 
interest rates down. On the other hand, favorable conditions for investment will put upward 
pressure on interest rates. Governments can affect both the supply of savings and the demand 
for investment through spending, taxation, and regulatory policies. Finally, as markets become 
increasingly interconnected, global factors play a role in the determination of U.S. interest 
rates. In the long-run, monetary policy is to a first-order approximation neutral, so we can 
abstract from inflation and focus on the long-run “real” determinants of interest rates. We will 
return to the impact of inflation on the yield curve in Section 4.1.  
Table 1 summarizes macroeconomic trends thought to affect long-run interest rates. We 
discuss each trend in more detail in separate subsections below.  
Table 1. Summary of factors affecting long-run interest rates. 
Macroeconomic trend Likely impact on interest rate 
Falling productivity growth ↓ 
Changing demographics  
          Falling population growth ↓ 
          Rising dependency ratio ↑ 
          Rising longevity ↓ 
Rising government debt ↑ 
Increased demand for safe assets  
          Financial regulation ↓ 
          Demand from Pension and Insurance sector ↓ 
          EME demand for US Treasury securities ↓ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ↑? 
          EME demand for foreign exchange reserves ↓ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ↑? 
Global imbalances (changing) ↓ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ↑? 
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2.1 Labor productivity  
A decrease in labor productivity reduces the capital’s marginal product, reduces 
investment demand, and lowers the interest rate. Labor productivity has been on a secular 
decline across the largest advanced economies since the 1980s, and this decline coincides 
with the general decline in long-run interest rates. Views on future long-run productivity range 
from pessimistic (Gordon 2010) to highly optimistic (Mokyr 2014, Bloom et al. 2014). Our work 
does not contribute to this debate except to note that historically, the simple link between labor 
productivity and long-run rates is fairly weak. Figure 1 plots the 10-year U.S. real interest rate 
and the growth rate of U.S. labor productivity (at the quarterly frequency) over the period 1948 
to 2018, with outlier points and recessions labeled.1 The real interest rate is the interest rate on 
a 10-year Treasury note less the year-on-year inflation rate. Labor productivity is the year-on-
year growth rate of labor productivity in the U.S. nonfarm business sector, again at a quarterly 
frequency. As the figure indicates, there is a significant positive relationship between the two 
variables, though the coefficient is fairly small (the unconditional regression coefficient of the 
real rate on productivity growth is 0.23, with a 𝑝𝑝-value of 1.2 ∙ 10−6).2 Our analysis in Section 4 
will confirm that productivity is a significant, though somewhat weak, driver of interest rates.  
  
                                               
1 Source: Interest rate – Robert Shiller online data. Labor productivity – Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
2 Hansen and Seshadri (2014) consider a longer, 1900 to 2011 sample and find a negative correlation 
between the real interest rate and productivity growth. This negative correlation appears to be driven 
by real interest rate volatility early in their sample period that included two wars and the deflation 
episode associated with the Great Depression. In the 1953 to 2011 subsample of their data, the 
correlation between productivity and the interest rate is 0.23, consistent with what we report. 
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Figure 1. 10-year U.S. real interest rate and the growth rate of U.S. labor productivity. 
 
While textbook macroeconomics predicts a positive correlation between the interest rate 
and productivity growth, a weak or even a negative correlation can be rationalized in a richer 
macroeconomic model where households’ fertility decisions respond to the level of income 
(e.g. Barro and Becker 1989). We turn next to the role of demographic factors in the 
determination of interest rates in the medium- to long-run. 
2.2 Changing demographic factors 
The interest rate response to changing demographics is complex because population 
growth and a changing age structure affect the demand for investment as well as the supply of 
savings and do so at different horizons. Economic theory predicts that the effect of a 
permanent decrease in the population growth rate on the long-run interest rate critically 
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depends on the extent of familial altruism in household preferences. In the canonical 
overlapping generations model, for instance, households save only for their own consumption 
in retirement and leave no bequests. This model predicts that a decline in population growth 
and a fall in productivity growth are both associated with a fall in the long-run interest rate. By 
contrast, in the Ramsey model where households take into account the their offspring’s well-
being, population growth changes have a small or even no effect on the long-run interest rate, 
depending on the extent of familial altruism (e.g. Baker et al. 2005, p. 300). 
The term structure of interest rates will reflect both the long-run adjustment to changes 
in the age composition of the population as well as the transition to the new long-run 
equilibrium. Life expectancy in advanced economies is projected to rise by about 25 years 
between 1950 to 2050, while the population growth rate is expected to fall to virtually zero (see 
Carvalho et al. 2016, Figure 2). During the transition to an older, longer-lived population, there 
is downward pressure on interest rates as workers save in anticipation of a longer retirement 
phase. In the long run, however, the larger share of the elderly in the total population will 
reduce total private saving and push the interest rate in the opposite direction. Because 
demographic changes are slow, it is likely that the low rates observed today could persist for 
some time. However, in the very long run, the rising share of the elderly could begin to push 
interest rates up. How these changes are reflected in the term structure of interest rates 
depends on the relative strength of these different effects. 
The arguments above focus on the impact of demographic changes on the rate of 
saving. As Geanakoplos et al. (2004) point out, there is a connection between changes in the 
population’s age composition and the returns to capital as reflected in the earnings-price ratio. 
This is a relationship that we will explore in section 4.1. Carvalho et al. (2016) argue that the 
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demographic transition can affect the equilibrium real interest rate through three channels. An 
increase in longevity (or expectations thereof) puts downward pressure on the real interest 
rate, as agents build up their savings in anticipation of a longer retirement period. A reduction 
in population growth makes the labor force and output grow more slowly, and thereby reduces 
investment demand. This lowers the rate of return on equity in the business sector. When 
demand growth is slow, both the earnings-price ratio and the return on equity are lower. We 
will find below that the earnings-price ratio emerges as a significant driver of long-run interest 
rates, possibly due to the effects of demographic changes.  
2.3 Government debt  
Government debt ratios as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose dramatically 
in the U.S. and much of Europe after the global financial crisis. Economic theory suggests that, 
unless Ricardian equivalence holds (i.e., conditions such that households anticipate the higher 
taxes needed to service the debt and respond by offsetting government dissaving with private 
saving), increases in government borrowing should result in a downward shift in total savings 
and an increase in the interest rate. The rise in the interest rate will crowd out private 
investment and reduce economic activity. Calibrated and estimated dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) models tend to predict a crowding out effect from increased 
government debt, particularly when higher debt is a result of lower growth or increased 
nonproductive transfers to the private sector.  
Despite this theoretical prediction, there is little empirical evidence of a secular trend in 
long-run rates due to the rise in public sector borrowing or of a crowding out effect on 
investment. Indeed, in his 2019 Presidential Address to the American Economic Association, 
Olivier Blanchard argued that in this low interest rate environment that seems set to last, 
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increased public debt may come at no fiscal cost and at only a limited cost to overall economic 
welfare. This is not to say that there is no connection between interest rates and government 
debt. Concerns about solvency did produce spikes in risk premia for some countries in Europe 
and there is ample evidence from emerging markets that low economic growth coupled with 
high public debt can trigger sudden capital flow reversals, high interest rates, and deep 
economic recessions. Nevertheless, investors generally perceive government debt issued by 
the largest advanced economies as relatively low risk. Indeed, many have argued that financial 
sector demand for low-risk, highly liquid assets has played an important role in suppressing 
interest rates despite high levels of public debt. 
Figure 2. Stock of foreign exchange reserves in emerging markets.  
 
Source: Domanski et al. 2016 
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2.4 Demand for safe assets 
The regulatory response to the financial crisis — chiefly the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) 
— deepened the incentives for holding safe, liquid assets on the part of commercial banks, 
pensions, and insurance companies. According to Greenwood and Vissing-Jorgensen (2018), 
the ratio of Treasury holdings to private loans for commercial banks increased five-fold after 
the DFA and bond prices rose even as the supply of debt expanded. They also document that 
pension and insurance companies increased their holdings, further driving down yields.  
Demand for safe assets is not restricted to U.S. financial institutions. Indeed, by 2017 
foreign investors held $6 trillion of long-maturity bonds, compared to the $500 billion held by 
U.S. commercial banks. Figure 2 below shows the rise in foreign exchange (FX) reserves held 
by the emerging markets’ (EMEs) central banks, which account for a substantial fraction of 
foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries.  Domanski et al. (2016) observe that since the global 
financial crisis, two developments in particular may have increased financial stability concerns 
in emerging markets and, therefore, a greater need for large, liquid reserves. One is the rapid 
growth of emerging-market, foreign-currency denominated debt. A second, related trend is 
growth in emerging-market securities held by foreign institutional investors. Both factors 
increase the exposure of emerging markets to swings in capital flows and large changes in 
exchange rates.  
It is unclear whether global demand for safe assets will be sustained going forward. As 
Figure 2 shows, since 2013, major EMEs have on balance sold FX reserves — note especially 
the sell off by China starting in 2015. If this trend continues, it would exert an upward pressure 
on U.S. interest rates going forward. 
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Figure 3. Saving and investment by country group and for the world economy.  
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, various issues 
2.5 Global saving and investment 
As the discussion on the demand for safe assets implies, global factors are becoming 
increasingly important for the determination of U.S. interest rates. In a closed economy, the 
real interest rate is determined by the equality between domestic investment and national 
saving. In an open economy, a country’s savings will seek the global financial market’s highest 
rate of return, and firms wishing to invest will seek out the lowest cost of capital. Ultimately, if 
markets are fully integrated, the global interest rate will be determined by saving and 
investment for the world as a whole, with current account balances reflecting the gaps between 
saving and investment at the national level.  
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Figure 3 illustrates saving and investment rates for advanced economies, for emerging 
markets, and for the world as a whole. The figure reveals the “global imbalances” that emerged 
during the 2000s — the rise in emerging market saving relative to investment. Many have 
argued that the expanded pool of excess savings depressed global interest rates. The 
consequent search for yield fueled risk-taking behavior in advanced economies, thereby 
sowing the seeds of the global financial crisis. Leaving the merits of that argument aside, 
Section 2.4 touched on one explanation for the “excess savings” of emerging markets — the 
increased demand for dollar reserves as a buffer for potentially disruptive exchange rate 
movements. Another explanation for the large supply of savings is financial repression in 
emerging markets. Mendoza, et al. (2009) argue that the combination of limited insurance 
markets and collateral constraints lead firms to accumulate precautionary savings to self-
insure against adverse shocks. This increased supply of savings suppresses interest rates in 
emerging markets and helps explain the “excess” supply of savings relative to investment in 
fast-growing, but high-risk, emerging markets.   
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Figure 4. 10-year Treasury rates and historical Blue Chip forecasts 
 
In recent years, evidence of a saving-investment gap between emerging markets and 
advanced economies has diminished. Indeed, according to International Monetary Fund 
projections, the gap will be small in the years going forward. As noted above (and shown in 
Figure 2) China’s stock of foreign exchange reserves — a substantial fraction of which is in 
U.S. Treasuries — has recently reversed course. If these trends continue, the downward 
pressure on interest rates coming from saving in emerging markets in the future will be 
lessened.   
Summary 
An overview of recent trends suggests that changes in demographics, productivity 
growth, and demand for safe assets by private and institutional investors are important 
determinants of long-run interest rates. It also is evident that global factors have become more 
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important over time. This suggests a possibility that global macroeconomic variables may 
contain useful information for long-run interest rate forecasts. 
3. Interest rate forecasting methodologies 
Forecasting is hard. For decades, forecasters missed the decline in long-run rates. 
Figure 4 plots the yield curve forecasts reported by Blue Chip Economic Indicators at different 
points in time along with the actual path of the U.S. 10-year Treasury rate. As is clear from the 
figure, while forecasted rates shifted downward somewhat over time, there remained a strong 
tendency to predict that the long-run rate would revert back to a range of 4 to 6%. This was 
despite the fact that the 10-year Treasury rate had not consistently remained in that range 
since the early 2000s. Eighteen months ago, the 10-year rate was forecasted to be 3.2%, a full 
percentage point greater than the actual rate of just below 2%. 
3.1 Econometric models used in yield forecasting 
Forecasting the interest rate is a question of longstanding interest among academics 
and practitioners alike. For the purposes of this discussion, it is useful to differentiate statistical 
forecasting models along two dimensions: (i) the set of explanatory variables for bond prices or 
yields (also referred to as state variables, risk factors, or pricing factors) and (ii) the features of 
the term structure model, particularly, the inclusion of no-arbitrage conditions.  
3.1.1. Yield curve estimation 
Yield curves are not observed directly, and they must be estimated from a cross-section 
of bond prices. The estimates are then treated as a data input into an econometric model of 
the term structure. To explain alternative methods for estimating yield curves, it is helpful to 
introduce some definitions and notation. Let 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denote the date-𝑡𝑡 price of a zero-coupon bond 
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maturing at date 𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒. The cross-section of bond prices arranged by maturity form a discount 
curve, 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑒𝑒−𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 , 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 is the zero-coupon yield to maturity. The yields 𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 form the zero-coupon yield 
curve. At each date 𝑡𝑡, the yield curve reveals the return on the set of bonds with a range of 
maturities, typically from the “short” end of the yield curve (one to three months) to as long as 
30 years. Coupon bonds can be priced in the same way, as the present value of future coupon 
payments and the principal.  
The forward rate, 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 is defined as the rate of appreciation of a bond as it approaches 
maturity, 
𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = − 1𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 . 
Accordingly, the yield to maturity is the average of the future forward rates: 
𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑒𝑒� 𝑓𝑓𝜏𝜏,𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛0 . 
Two approaches are commonly deployed to estimate the yield curve. The first is to fit a 
cubic or an exponential spline to the discount curve (e.g., McCulloch 1975, Vasicek and Fong 
1982). The second approach is to construct the forward rates sequentially using a maturity-
sorted bond portfolio (Fama and Bliss 1987), and then to fit a smooth curve to the resulting 
data on yields. 
3.1.2. State variables 
Researchers use several methods in both the selection and construction of state 
variables. Most commonly, information contained in the yield curve is summarized by a small 
set of linear combinations of yields, typically the first three principal components of the 
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covariance matrix of yields at different maturities (see Section 4.2 below for details). This 
reduces the dimensionality of the state vector, an essential step in controlling the number of 
parameters to estimate.  
While the principal component approach is the most common, the dynamic Nelson-
Siegel model uses a somewhat different method for summarizing the yield curve. The model 
fits a functional form for the yield curve to the cross-sections of yields to estimate the latent 
state variables. One advantage of this method is that latent variables thus constructed have a 
clearer interpretation as level, slope, and curvature factors, whereas the same interpretation 
for principal components holds in a less precise sense. 
Statistical models of the term structure fall into two categories with respect to the set of 
the state variables they use. Yields-only models use only the information contained in yield 
curves themselves. Macrofinance models add other observables, such as measures of real 
activity, inflation, and information from macroeconomic forecasts. We discuss the 
macrofinance models in more detail in Section 3.1.4. 
Table 2. Categories of statistical models for interest rate forecasting. 
Model type 
State variables 
Latent variables 
deriving from yields 
Latent and 
macroeconomic 
variables 
Latent, 
demographic and 
macroeconomic 
variables 
No-arbitrage affine 
model Adrian et al. 2013 
Ang and Piazzesi 2003; 
Wright 2011  
Reduced form affine 
model Abbritti et al. 2018 
Ludvigson and Ng 2009; 
Joslin et al. 2014; 
This paper 
Favero et al. 2016 
Reduced form 
dynamic Nelson-
Siegel model 
Diebold and Li 2006; 
Diebold et al. 2008 Coroneo et al. 2014  
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Table 2 presents a taxonomy of statistical models commonly used in interest rate 
forecasting. Besides using different sets of state variables, common models in the literature 
differ with respect to imposing no-arbitrage conditions on the time series of bond prices. 
Reduced form models require that bonds be consistently priced in a cross-section. No-
arbitrage models require, in addition, that bonds be consistently priced over time. In the next 
subsection, we discuss no-arbitrage conditions in more detail. 
3.1.3. No-arbitrage conditions 
Forecasting methods grounded in finance theory start with the premise that asset prices 
incorporate all information available to investors and that arbitrage opportunities are either 
absent or transitory. The information available to investors at date 𝑡𝑡 is contained in the state 
vector 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡. The state vector follows a Markov process that captures the evolving set of 
information relevant for computing conditional expectations of future interest rates and bond 
prices. The model specifies an intertemporal, no-arbitrage condition of the form 
 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛−1,𝑡𝑡+1|𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡) 
(1) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 is the price of a bond with maturity 𝑒𝑒 at date 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀 is the stochastic discount 
factor, also referred to as the pricing kernel. Estimating the model involves estimating the 
stochastic process for the state vector as well as the functional form for the stochastic discount 
factor, 𝑀𝑀(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡). A widely used class of empirical no-arbitrage models used to obtain joint 
forecasts of future yields, future returns, and risk premia derive from the class of affine yield-
factor term structure models is introduced in Duffie and Kan (1996) and categorized in Dai and 
Singleton (2000). 
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One advantage of no-arbitrage models is that they can interpret information contained in 
a panel of bond prices rather than working off repeated cross-sections. Another advantage is 
that a no-arbitrage model can separately quantify the effects of individual risk factors on bond 
prices by estimating a functional form for the stochastic discount factor. This is useful, in 
particular, for pricing derivative securities. The main disadvantage of no-arbitrage models is 
that their estimation is usually computationally intensive, and computational constraints may 
limit the size of the state vector for which estimation is practical.3 
Reduced-form affine models posit a linear relationship between yields and pricing 
factors, but they do not impose intertemporal no-arbitrage conditions requiring that bonds be 
priced consistently at different dates. No-arbitrage conditions do not affect the dynamics of the 
state variables, but they do affect the mapping from state variables to yields. 
In general, it is not clear whether reduced-form and no-arbitrage models produce 
significantly different interest rate forecasts despite the different specification of the mappings 
from states to yields. Pericoli and Taboga (2012), for example, show that the fitted yields 
almost coincide between a no-arbitrage affine term structure model and its reduced-form 
counterpart. In contrast, Ang and Piazzesi (2003) show that the model with no-arbitrage 
conditions forecasts better than one without.  
In some cases, it is possible to theoretically show that omitting no-arbitrage conditions 
involves no loss of information. For instance, Joslin et al. (2011) provide conditions when the 
                                               
3 Adrian et al. (2013) estimate the affine term structure model without imposing cross-parameter bond 
pricing restrictions derived from no-arbitrage conditions. They instead incorporate a return pricing 
error into equation (3). The resulting system of equations can be estimated with a multistep linear 
procedure. Their procedure does not rely on a constructed yield curve, as it can use coupon bond 
prices directly as a data input. 
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no-arbitrage restrictions have no effect on the maximum likelihood parameter estimates within 
a class of yields-only affine models.  
The approach we take in this paper is to use a reduced-form affine model. This is partly 
because our focus is interest rate forecasting rather than asset pricing. The advantage is that 
the model can be consistently estimated with simple OLS, and we thus avoid computational 
complexities stemming from a nonlinear estimation procedure. 
3.1.4. Macrofinance models 
The role of macroeconomic factors in interest rate forecasting in addition to yield-only 
factors is a subject of ongoing investigation and debate. To frame our discussion, it is 
convenient to use a decomposition of bond yields into a sequence of expected short rates and 
expected excess returns. One can show that (see, e.g., Duffee 2013) the current yield on an 𝑒𝑒-
period bond equals the sum of expected future short rates and the risk (or term) premium that 
depends on expected future excess returns: 
 𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑒𝑒��𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡�𝑦𝑦1,𝑡𝑡+𝜏𝜏�𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡� + 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡�𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡+𝜏𝜏−1,𝑡𝑡+𝜏𝜏𝑛𝑛−𝜏𝜏 �𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡��,𝑛𝑛−1
𝜏𝜏=1
 
(2) 
where the excess return is defined as  
 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1𝑛𝑛 = ln�𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛−1,𝑡𝑡+1𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 � − ln� 1𝑃𝑃1,𝑡𝑡� . (3) 
The yield decomposition in Equation (2) is helpful for understanding the role of 
information contained in the state variables. In particular, Equation (2) illustrates an interesting 
possibility that there can be so-called “hidden factors” — state variables that have opposite 
and offsetting effects on expected short rates and expected excess returns (see, e.g., Duffee 
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2011 and Joslin et al. 2014). Such factors can have a small effect on the cross section of 
yields but potentially large effects on the dynamics of yields themselves. For this reason, if 
hidden factors are present, the information contained in the current cross-section of yields is 
insufficient for forecasting future yields. Macroeconomic variables seem to be natural 
candidates as potential hidden factors since economic theory predicts a relationship between 
real activity and future yields.  
Accordingly, a large body of recent research focuses on incorporating macroeconomic 
variables in econometric frameworks for yield forecasting. It is unclear which set of 
macroeconomic variables is a good candidate for hidden factors. Our analysis in Section 4.3 
adds to this aspect of the macrofinance body of research by expanding the set of 
macroeconomic variables to include not just domestic economic indicators and forecasts, but 
also measures of global real activity. 
One advantage of macrofinance models is that they link the dynamics of 
macroeconomic variables to the dynamics of yields. This potentially allows using economic 
theory to inform the selection of the econometric model’s state variables, incorporating 
macroeconomic forecasts in the estimation, and quantifying the relationships between yields 
and macroeconomic fundamentals.  
Potential parameter instability is another reason to include macrovariables in forecasting 
models. If the relation between macrovariables and expected yields is believed to be more 
stable over time than the one between current yields and expected yields, forecasts based on 
macroeconomic variables may turn out to be more reliable. However, with sample lengths of 
150 quarters or so, even macrofinance models may fail to capture low-frequency movements 
in yields, and they may incorrectly attribute observed trends to a sequence of random shocks. 
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Economic theory predicts that macroeconomic variables may help forecast the level 
component of yields in particular. Prior research on yields-only models has cast doubt on 
whether the current term structure contains information about changes in the future level of 
yields (e.g., Duffee 2011, Table 2). Accordingly, yields-only models may not be as informative 
on predicting the change in yield levels. 
An extension of the macrofinance model uses additional insights from economic theory 
that suggests population composition can account for low-frequency movements of interest 
rates.4 Favero et al. (2016) add the population composition state variable (specifically, the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 
ratio that we depict on Figure 5) to an otherwise standard reduced-form term structure model. 
Besides latent factors and population composition, the model’s state vector includes inflation 
and output gap. Their estimates find a significant effect of the population composition trend — 
itself an echo effect of the baby boom — on the level component of yields. This result suggests 
that population composition changes may have contributed to falling interest rates in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Most recently, however, the demographic and the interest rate trends have 
diverged: the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ratio has bottomed out in 2003 and has been growing for the past 15 years 
whereas the real rates kept falling. If anything, the current population composition should put 
upward pressure on the interest rate most recently.5 
                                               
4 Geanakoplos et al. (2004) argue that demographic changes in the U.S. induced cyclical behavior of 
security prices. They use an overlapping generations model with a time-varying demographic 
structure to show that the rates of return on equity and bonds rise with the change in the ratio of 
middle-aged to young agents. This is driven by life-cycle saving behavior. For instance, a large 
middle-aged cohort seeking to save for retirement will push up the prices of financial assets (see also 
Section 4.1 below). 
5Del Negro et al. (2018, Figure 5), show that this phenomenon is not specific to the U.S: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ratios are 
trending up in Germany, U.K., and Canada while their real rates are falling. 
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It is still unclear whether macrofinance models improve forecasting the level component 
of the yield curve. Ang and Piazzessi (2003), for instance, obtain virtually the same dynamics 
of the level factor whether or not macroeconomic variables are included. This suggests that 
macroeconomic variables add little to the model’s ability to predict the changes in the level of 
yields. Our results in section 4.4 are somewhat more nuanced. We estimate a dynamic model 
of yields to check whether forward-looking economic indicators — U.S. as well as global — 
appear to be hidden factors. 
Our estimates of the model with macrovariables show that the level component of yields 
depends on both productivity growth and expected inflation, and the component’s estimated 
persistence is substantially reduced compared to that in the yields-only model. This finding 
contrasts with Ang and Piazzesi (2003), however, it appears to be sensitive to both the sample 
period and the set of macroeconomic indicators included in the model.  
Overall, the literature on macrofinance forecasting models seems to suggest that real 
activity indicators are useful in understanding risk premia on bonds. There is less evidence on 
whether forecasting models can predict changes in interest rate levels, although this paper’s 
results offer some hope in this respect. 
The above discussion outlines difficulties in using forecasting models for predicting 
interest rate trends. Accordingly, the question of constructing long-run interest rate projections 
calls for a broader set of methodologies, including those that use insights from economic 
theory to inform empirical specifications. We next turn to reviewing analyses that specifically 
focus on interest rate trends.  
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3.2 Interest rate trend decompositions 
This section reviews several methodologies for long-run interest rate projections and 
outlines some conclusions that can be drawn from them. These approaches use semi-
structural methods to understand long-run interest rate trends from asset pricing and wealth 
accumulation perspectives. 
3.2.1 Interest rate trend estimation and decomposition using cross-country data 
In Section 3.1, we made an argument for using long historical samples for the purposes 
of detecting interest rate trends. One example of this approach is undertaken in a paper by Del 
Negro et al. (2018). They jointly estimate trends in real rates for seven advanced economies 
using data on short- and long-term interest rates, inflation, and consumption starting in 1870. 
The method decomposes real rates and term premia into a common component, a country-
specific component, and a convenience yield, which is a rate cut that investors are willing to 
take in exchange for holding a safe and liquid asset. Convenience yields are identified with the 
assumption that all assets are priced with the same stochastic discount factor. The stochastic 
discount factor is tied to data on consumption growth. 
The analysis points to three major drivers of falling interest rates since the 1980s: 
increasing convenience yield, a slowdown in global growth, and an increase in desired saving. 
The rising convenience yield accounts for more than half of the world real interest rate decline 
(more than 90 basis over the past 25 years), and it makes a larger contribution to the declining 
rate since 1997. The slowdown in global growth accounts for about one-third of the decline, or 
60 basis points. The rest of the decline, about 40 basis points, is attributed to a rising desire to 
save. 
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The account of rising convenience yield and rising desire to save as drivers of the lower 
world interest rate appears to be consistent with “safe asset shortage” as an explanation for 
low rates (e.g., Caballero et al. 2017). According to this view, the rise in the emerging 
economies’ wealth may have changed the composition of international investors in terms of 
their risk attitudes and the overall desire to save, and this change brought about rising 
convenience yields and falling rates.6  
Factors other than capital flows from emerging markets might have contributed to rising 
convenience yields over the same period. Pension and insurance (P&I) companies in 
developed economies are large buyers of long-maturity bonds, for reasons having to do with 
both regulation and liability-matching. Changes in regulation of P&I companies have been 
shown to make a significant impact on interest rates.7 
Convenience yields cannot expand indefinitely. In fact, if a large portion of demand for 
safe assets comes from emerging economies, the global economic growth slowdown may 
reduce capital flows into safe assets, as discussed in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. The perceived 
safety of government debt itself depends on its growth relative to a country’s repayment 
capacity. The recent changes in capital flows shown on Figures 2 and 3, as well as recent 
rapid growth of debt-GDP ratio in the U.S. may temper or reverse the rise in convenience yield. 
More generally, changes in wealth accumulation patterns on a global scale may encode 
information about the trajectory of future interest rates. In the next section, we look at the 
                                               
6Caballero et al. (2008) and Hall (2016) propose stylized theoretical frameworks tailored to illustrating 
the impact of risks faced by emerging economies on the interest rate trends. 
7 Greenwood and Vissing-Jorgensen (2018) show that regulation-induced changes in demand for long-
term bonds can cause large movements in the slope at the long end of the yield curve. Their findings 
suggest that the difference between P&I asset to GDP ratio and government debt to GDP ratio has a 
correlation of about −0.7 with the 30-year to 10-year yield spread. 
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present value method aimed at extracting this information from the time path of the 
consumption-wealth ratio. 
3.2.2 Present value approach 
Gourinchas and Rey (2019) is another example of a methodology that uses both a long 
historical sample and a global perspective to understand interest rate trends. They use a 
present-value global resource constraint to link the past dynamics of consumption to wealth 
ratio and the future interest rate trajectory. A high consumption to wealth ratio is proposed as 
an indicator of future low rates.  
With the present value approach, growth in consumption-wealth ratio can be 
decomposed into expected change in the risk-free interest rate, expected change in the risk 
premium, and expected change in consumption growth rate. If changes in risk premium or 
consumption growth rate are not forecastable, a high consumption-to-wealth ratio would 
indicate that the interest rate is on a falling trajectory. Consistent with this intuitive description, 
Gourinchas and Rey (2019) show that consumption-to-wealth ratio does predict risk-free rates.  
The main results in Gourinchas and Rey (2019) are broadly consistent with those in Del 
Negro et al. (2018). Gourinchas and Rey (2019) find that productivity growth and population 
growth partially account for the downward trend in the risk-free rate. They also show that a rise 
in desire to save and reduced appetite for risk are major contributors to the falling interest rate 
trend. However, they interpret the changes in investor behavior as stemming from 
deleveraging after the great financial crisis. Deleveraging might provide an alternative 
interpretation for recently growing convenience yields measured in Del Negro et al. (2018). 
Long-range forecasts in Gourinchas and Rey (2019) suggest that an extended period of 
low interest rates is ahead, with the U.S. annual real risk-free rate of -1.3%. In large part, their 
25 
proposed explanation for the low interest rate is increased demand for saving stemming from 
the protracted deleveraging process that followed the Great financial crisis. 
Summary 
Studies mentioned above suggest that a global perspective on interest rates can deliver 
useful insights by extracting information from a richer body of evidence interpreted through the 
lens of economic theory. Moreover, semistructural methods inform long-range interest rate 
projections in ways that complement statistical forecasts. For instance, a quantitative interest 
trend decomposition into contributing factors opens a possibility for scenario forecasting based 
on assumptions about persistence or reversal of separate factors related to risk preferences, 
saving behavior, or global macroeconomic conditions. 
Interest rate trend decompositions also inform on the selection of state variables for a 
macrofinance forecasting model. If changes in risk attitudes are an important driver of interest 
rates, forward-looking indicators — such as measures of consumer and business confidence 
— may contain valuable information for statistical forecasting. 
In the next section, we use insights from interest rate trend decompositions to add  
forward-looking economic indicators to the state variable set of a standard macrofinance 
forecasting model. We experiment with both domestic and global forward-looking indicators 
and assess the model’s ability to forecast the level component of yields.  
4. Economic indicators potentially useful in interest rate forecasting 
One of our goals is to identify a set of economic indicators that capture the dynamics of 
interest rate trends. These indicators may also prove to be useful for forecasting. We start with 
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an analysis of the 10-year U.S. Treasury rate to understand interest rate dynamics since 1981, 
the point at which nominal rates in the U.S. and foreign markets began their decline.  
4.1 10-year Treasury rate decomposition 
We rely on economic theory to guide our choice of variables to include in the analysis, 
although we do not take a firm stand on the precise specification of a model. We use quarterly 
data from 1981:Q3 to 2019:Q1. The dependent variable to be explained is the 10-year nominal 
Treasury rate. 𝑦𝑦10,𝑡𝑡. 
Up to this point, our discussion has focused on the determinants of the long-run real 
interest rate. The variable we observe, however, is the long-run nominal interest rate. While 
most economists would agree that the role of inflation is likely to be small if not zero in the very 
long run, inflation will affect yields at shorter maturities as we will show below. We, therefore, 
include inflation as a control. Because expectations about future inflation are important for the 
current interest rate, we include a time-smoothed measure of inflation that includes expected 
inflation as well as past inflation. Our measure is:  
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−4 + (1 − 𝜔𝜔)𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+4𝑒𝑒  
where 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−4 is CPI inflation rate over the past four quarters and 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+4𝑒𝑒  is expected inflation over 
the next 4 quarters.8  
The second explanatory variable included in our analysis is the growth rate of 
consumption. Macroeconomic theory interprets the “stochastic discount factor” 𝑀𝑀 in section 
3.1.3 as the expected intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption. We, 
                                               
8 Data sources: 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−4,𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡−4 – NIPA CPI inflation and growth rate or private consumption expenditure, 
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+4
𝑒𝑒 ,𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡+4𝑒𝑒  – Survey of Professional Forecasters. 
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therefore, include the growth rate of real private consumption expenditure (PCE), which is 
again smoothed over time to include both past and future expected consumption growth: 
𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡 = 12𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡−4 + 12𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡+4𝑒𝑒  
where 𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡−4 is the growth rate of the real private consumption expenditure over the past four 
quarters and, and 𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡+4𝑒𝑒  is the forecast of the same, four quarters forward. Note that because 
we are using total real PCE and not per capita PCE, changes in population growth will also be 
picked up by this variable.  
We also include a measure of labor productivity growth, 𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡−4, measured as the growth 
rate of business sector real output per hour over the previous four quarters. Although we saw 
in Figure 1 that there is only a weak, unconditional relationship between productivity growth 
and the long-run rate, we include it in the analysis because it is possible that productivity 
growth will play a stronger role after conditioning on other variables.  
Finally, we include in the regression the inverse of Robert Shiller’s CAPE ratio — that is, 
the ratio of average real earnings 10 years back to the current inflation-adjusted S&P index — 
as our financial market variable, denoted 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡. In the textbook macroeconomic model, the long-
run value of this ratio is equal to the real rate of equity return in the business sector. If equity 
returns are high, this could be a signal that the returns to investment are high and interest 
rates will also be high.   
Another reason for inclusion of the CAPE ratio is that, as we noted above, cyclical 
variations in 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 seem to capture the effects of population dynamics on asset returns 
(Geanakoplos et al. 2004). In particular, Geanakoplos et al. (2004) suggests that the relevant 
demographic variable is the ratio of young workers (ages 20 to 29) to workers in the middle of 
the age distribution (ages 40 to 49), denoted the by YM ratio. Figure 5 depicts the relation 
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between Shiller’s 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃, the real 10-year rate, and the YM ratio since 1953. The YM ratio, EP, 
and real rate all track one another well since the 1960s. However, the YM ratio bottomed out in 
2002 and has been rising since. If anything, the demographic argument suggests that the 
changing age composition of the population should be putting an upward pressure on the real 
rate and on EP. Del Negro et al. (2018) point out the divergence between YM and interest 
rates for other countries as well. 
Figure 5. Earnings-to-price ratio, 10-year real rate, and young-to-middle (20 to 29 year 
olds over 40 to 49 year olds) ratio. 
 
The estimating equation is  
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We take the stand that, in the long run, inflation is neutral, so that a 1 percentage point 
increase in inflation that is expected to be permanent should lead to a 1 percentage point rise 
in the long-run nominal rate. Accordingly, we choose the weight 𝜔𝜔 so that the coefficient 𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋 =1. Under this restriction, Table 3 reports the estimates for the coefficients on consumption 
growth, productivity growth, and the EP ratio (the units of interest rates and growth rates are 
annual percent).  
Table 3. 10-year rate decomposition. 
10-year rate 𝜷𝜷𝝅𝝅 (𝝎𝝎 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟔𝟔) 𝜷𝜷𝑪𝑪 𝜷𝜷𝒚𝒚 𝜷𝜷𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 𝜷𝜷𝟎𝟎 
Coeff. 1.00 0.74 0.34 0.64 -2.28 
Std. error 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.35 
𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟖𝟖𝟖𝟖 𝑁𝑁 = 151  
 
The regression coefficients in Table 3 can be interpreted as the elasticities of the 
nominal 10-year rate with respect to the rate of inflation, growth rate of private consumption 
expenditure, productivity growth, and the earnings-to-price ratio. Each of the variables enters 
with the expected sign, with increases in productivity growth, consumption growth, and the EP 
ratio all contributing to an increase in the interest rate. The largest elasticities as estimated 
over the full sample are with respect to private consumption growth and the EP ratio.  
Figure 6 below illustrates the changing contribution of each factor over time. The solid 
blue line is the predicted real rate, 𝑦𝑦10,𝑡𝑡 − 𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡. We net out the impact of inflation, so that we 
can focus on the drivers of the long-run real interest rate. In the 1980s, the real interest rate 
(the dark blue line) and the contribution of the EP ratio (𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝛽𝛽0, the orange shaded area) 
were both high. Recall from Figure 5 that the young-to-middle ratio was high in that period, 
consistent with a high ratio of dis-savers in the economy and, therefore, a high interest rate. 
This demographic factor falls off by 1988, and coincides with the drop in the real rate over the 
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1980s. The contribution of productivity growth (𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡−4 in grey) to the real interest rate is small 
throughout the sample. The figure illustrates the collapse and then recovery of consumption 
(𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡 in yellow) in each of the recessions, accompanied by a fall and then an increase in the 
interest rate. By the end of the sample, the real interest is lower than what is predicted given 
the rate of consumption and productivity growth.  
Figure 6. Real interest rate decomposition 
 
To summarize, we find that the EP ratio (that captures demographic change), 
productivity growth, and consumption growth emerge as significant determinants of the long-
run real interest rate over the 1981:Q3 to 2019:Q1 period. The relative importance of the 
macroeconomic determinants changes over time, with the demographic factor mattering most 
in the 1981 to 1988 period and consumption growth most significant following recessions.  
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4.2 Principal components and long-run interest rates 
The analysis above focused on the long-run rate and its determinants. We now turn to 
an analysis of the yield curve, which conveys information both about the interest rate on long-
term bonds as well as the compensation investors demand for holding a 10-year bond relative 
to holding bonds with shorter maturities (i.e., the term structure). By making use of the full yield 
curve it is possible to extract a set of factors that captures interest rate dynamics in both the 
short and the long run.  
Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) proposed a technique for summarizing the yield 
curve with common factors that account for comovement of yields at different maturities. A 
common approach is to construct these common factors using principal component analysis. 
The principal components are linear combinations of yields at different maturities that account 
for the maximum portion of the variance-covariance matrix of yields. Constructing the principal 
components amounts to finding a rotation that diagonalizes the variance-covariance matrix of a 
panel of yield curves. 
We extract principal components on U.S. yield curves from quarterly data over the 
1981:Q3-2019:Q1 sample period. Our results are comparable to what is typically found in the 
literature. The first principal component accounts for almost all of the variation in yields 
(98.1%), while the second and third principal components account for 1.5% and 0.4% of the 
variation, respectively. The variation accounted for by additional components are at least an 
order of magnitude smaller so we drop them from our discussion.  
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Figure 7. Three principal components of U.S. yields, 1981:Q3-2019:Q1. 
 
Figure 7 depicts the time series for the three principal components. The first component 
has a clear downward time trend. Over this period nominal interest rates were falling as was 
the rate of inflation. The fact that so much of the comovement in yield curves is captured by a 
secular downward trend is an indication that the low frequency drivers of the interest rate 
discussed above have a reasonable chance of explaining yield curves since the early 1980s.  
The second component is harder to interpret, with sharp swings and an irregular cyclical 
pattern between the 1980s and later in the sample. It has been suggested that the second 
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component is related to the business cycle (e.g., Abbritti et al. 2018). The troughs in the 
second component occur in 1983:Q1, 1985:Q3, 1993:Q2, 2003:Q3, and 2010:Q4, roughly two 
years following a recession. It appears that there may be a connection to business-cycle 
downturns, though the connection is tenuous. 
The third component exhibits fluctuations at a higher frequency.  Note that although the 
second and third components explain less of the variation in yield curves in the estimation 
sample, this does not preclude the possibility that these factors are important for forecasting 
yields out of sample. For example, information that the economy may be shifting out of a boom 
into a recession may have only a slight impact on the trend, but could well be picked up by the 
second or third components and, therefore, could help forecast short-term yields.  
Figure 8. Loadings 𝒃𝒃𝒏𝒏 on the first (level), second (slope) and third (curvature) principal 
components as functions of maturity, 𝒏𝒏. 
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We next estimate the “factor loadings” of each component by running a regression of 
yields on the three principal components:   
 𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 + 𝑏𝑏1,𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋1,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏2,𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋2,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏3,𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋3,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 (4) 
This is done for yields of different maturities. The loadings are plotted in Figure 8 for 
maturities ranging from one month to 10 years. The first loading, 𝑏𝑏1,𝑛𝑛, (for each maturity 𝑒𝑒) is 
shown by the blue line. It is quite flat, indicating that most of the variation in yields can be 
explained by a factor that shifts the entire yield curve and is, therefore, often referred to as a 
“level factor.”  The second factor (the orange line) has a loading that is high at short maturities 
and low at long maturities. This factor is referred to as a “slope factor,” and a rise in this factor 
will make the yield curve flatter as it will raise short-term yields more than long-term yields. The 
third factor (in gray), the “curvature factor,” is higher at short- and long- maturities and lowest 
at middle maturities of three to six years.  
The principal components are a statistical method of describing patterns in yield curves. 
The components have no economic content in and of themselves. An interesting question, and 
one frequently asked in analyses of this type, is whether the principal components reflect a 
relationship between changes in macroeconomic variables that could be used to better 
understand the dynamics of yields in sample, as well as for forecasting out of sample. To this 
end, we examine whether the macroeconomic variables we found to be statistically significant 
for explaining the long-run interest rate in the previous section are associated with the principal 
components. To show this, we extract the principal components from a set of 151 yield curves 
over the 1981:Q3 to 2019:Q1 period and regress those components on the same set of 
variables as in Table 3.  
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The results are shown in Table 4. The regression coefficients have the same units as 
the standard deviation of the first principal component. For example, according to the 
estimates in the table, a 1% permanent rise in private consumption expenditure shifts the first 
principal component of yields up by about one-fifth of its standard deviation. Note that the 
smoothing weight for inflation is kept the same as in the previous specification. This means 
that we are not imposing that inflation be neutral, and we allow the principal components to 
reveal the impact of inflation on the nominal interest rate at different maturities.  
The first panel of Table 4 shows the coefficients of a regression of the first principal 
component on macroeconomic variables. The 𝑅𝑅2 on this regression is high at 0.87, an 
indication that the macroeconomic variables are successful in capturing the in-sample variation 
in yields. An increase in each of these variables results in a significant shift in the yield curve, 
with inflation having the largest elasticity, followed by consumption and the 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 ratio.  
Macroeconomic variables explain much less of the variance in the second and third 
principal components of yields (the second and third panels of the table). Inflation enters with a 
positive coefficient, indicating that a rise in inflation will have a stronger, positive impact on the 
yield curve at shorter maturities. The 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 ratio has the opposite sign, perhaps an indication that 
an 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 ratio makes the yield curve steeper. The third principal component is explained most 
strongly by consumption growth.  
To summarize, principal components analysis of U.S. yield curves over the 1981:Q3 to 
2019:Q1 period generates the standard result that the first component accounts for almost all 
of the yield variations. The first component has a clear downward time trend, consistent with 
falling nominal rates and a declining rate of inflation over this period. We find strong evidence 
of a relationship between the first principal component and the macroeconomic drivers 
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discussed in Section 2. That is, level shifts in the yield curve are largely driven by changes in 
inflation, consumption growth, and the EP ratio. 
Table 4. Decomposition of the first three principal components of yields. 
1st principal 
component of yields 𝜷𝜷𝝅𝝅 (𝝎𝝎 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟔𝟔) 𝜷𝜷𝑪𝑪 𝜷𝜷𝒚𝒚 𝜷𝜷𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 𝜷𝜷𝟎𝟎 
Coeff. 0.45 0.20 0.13 0.16 -3.02 
Std. error 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.11 
𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟖𝟖𝟖𝟖 𝑁𝑁 = 151     
2nd principal 
component of yields 𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋 (𝜔𝜔 = 0.6) 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶 𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝛽𝛽0 
Coeff. 0.59 -0.06 -0.01 -0.30 0.18 
Std. error 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.27 
𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟐𝟐𝟔𝟔 𝑁𝑁 = 151     
3d principal 
component of yields 𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋 (𝜔𝜔 = 0.6) 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶 𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝛽𝛽0 
Coeff. -0.05 0.39 -0.20 0.01 -0.60 
Std. error 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.28 
𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 𝑁𝑁 = 151     
4.3 Results from the dynamic model 
An advantage of using the full yield curve is that it has the potential to reveal information 
not only about the interest rate levels but also about the dynamic adjustment of interest rates 
to shocks. We implement a dynamic reduced form affine term structure model with a set of 
three latent variables stacked into a (3X1) vector 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 and three economic indicators in a 
separate (3X1) vector 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. The model is similar to that in Abbritti et al. (2018) but the state 
vector is different.9 The latent variables are the three principal components of the yield curves 
from three months to 10 years maturity. The model’s equations are 
 𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 + 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 (5) 
                                               
9 We thank Mirko Abbritti for sharing the MATLAB code for estimating the model. We report results with 
indirect-inference bias correction (Bauer et al. 2012). 
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 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = Φ𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + Λ𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 (6) 
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = Γ𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 
We assume that the shocks to economic indicators, 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡, and the shocks to the principal 
components, 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 are uncorrelated. We estimate (Λ,Φ, Γ, Σ𝑣𝑣, Σ𝜂𝜂) with ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and indirect-inference bias correction. The term structure model allows us to ask, what 
is the role of various macroeconomic indicators in explaining the dynamics of yield curves, 
after accounting for the role of the principal components? In particular, the vector 
autoregression (VAR) shows the change in yields at different maturities and the rate at which 
that impact dies out over time. 
4.3.1 U.S. economic indicators 
We estimate the dynamic model with U.S. economic indicators using the 1981:Q3 to 
2019:Q1 sample, the longest time period for which both inflation and consumption growth 
forecasts are available. The addition of shocks raises the complexity of the estimation 
procedure at an exponential rate, so we limit the set of economic indicators to three. In the first 
set, we include the 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 ratio, consumption growth, and inflation, where consumption growth and 
inflation are again smoothed. In the second set of indicators, we replace the 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 ratio with 
productivity growth, that is 
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
1 = �𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
�, and 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡2 = �𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡−4𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
�. 
Figure 9 depicts the impulse response of yields at different maturities to a one standard 
deviation shock to each of the three indicators. The figures show the estimated response of 
yields to innovations in the particular indicator at different maturities (one-year, three-year and 
10-year) and at different horizons (zero to 20 years). For example, the yellow line in the left-
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most panel of Figure 9 shows that a rise in the EP ratio has little effect on the 10-year rate on 
impact. In addition, the VAR does not pick up dynamic effects of the EP ratio on the 10-year 
rate over time, as the rate is not affected at out-horizons of five to 20 years. There does appear 
to be a weak, negative relationship between the EP ratio and short-term yields of one to five 
years, which turn positive at a five-year horizon.   
Consumption growth, the middle panel of Figure 9, has a strong, positive effect on 
yields, with the largest impact on the very short end of the yield curve. The impact on all yields 
is strongest at the three-year horizon and then quickly dies out. The dynamic response of 
yields to innovations in inflation is weak with most of the action in the one-year rate. 
Figure 9. Impulse responses to yields to 𝑭𝑭𝒕𝒕𝟏𝟏 indicators 
 
Figure 10 plots the variance decomposition that shows the percent of yield variance 
explained by each indicator in 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡1 at different forecasting horizons. The purple line shows the 
percent of variance explained by all three indicators together. Looking across the figures we 
see that consumption growth (the red line) explains up to 60% of the variance of short-term 
yields, even at a 10-year forecast horizon. The  𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 and 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 indicators explain almost none of 
the variance, an indication that neither of these variables adds information for forecasting 
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beyond what is already contained in the cross-section of yields and summarized by the three 
principal components in 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡. 
Figure 10. Variance decomposition for 𝑭𝑭𝒕𝒕𝟏𝟏 indicators. 
 
We next consider a triple of indicators 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡2 consisting of U.S. productivity growth, 
consumption growth, and inflation. Productivity growth (now in place of the 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 ratio) has a 
significant, positive effect on yields at all maturities at the one- to 10-year forecasting horizon. 
The impulse responses to consumption growth are little changed relative to the previous VAR 
specification, although the magnitude of the effects are slightly smaller. The inflation indicator 
now comes in positive, moving all three yields and peaking at the two — to three-year horizon.  
  
40 
Figure 11. Impulse responses to yields to 𝑭𝑭𝒕𝒕𝟐𝟐 indicators. 
 
Figure 12 (analogous to Figure 10) shows the variance decomposition for the indicators 
in 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡2. Relative to the previous VAR specification, we see that all three variables contain some 
information beyond the principal components. Together, the three indicators explain between 
60 and 75% of yield variance at the short end of the yield curve, and between 30 and 50% of 
variance at the long end. Productivity growth now explains as much as 40% of the variance of 
yields, particularly at the longer forecast horizons. Consumption growth continues to pick up 
variance at the short end of the yield curve. The inflation indicator 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 now explains up to 20% 
of the variance. 
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Figure 12. Variance decomposition for 𝑭𝑭𝒕𝒕𝟐𝟐 indicators. 
 
To summarize, there is little information in the 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 ratio beyond what is already captured 
by the principal components. In contrast, consumption growth and productivity growth play 
distinct roles in explaining the yield variances, with consumption growth being most important 
for short-term rates and productivity growth for both short- and long-term rates.  
4.3.2 Global economic indicators 
We now change the vector 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 to include a set of leading indicators for global economic 
activity. In the previous section, we found that consumption growth was an important factor for 
explaining U.S. interest rates. We add to the vector OECD-constructed composites of leading 
economic indicators10 for the EU (𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒 ) and the major five Asian economies (𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴5𝑒𝑒 ) (China, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, and Korea — Asia-5). Our sample period is 1990:Q2 to 2019:Q1, starting 
                                               
10 Specifically, the indicator is the growth rate in the trend-restored composite leading indicator (CLI) 
from the prior quarter. 
42 
with the earliest quarter when the Asian growth indicator is available. The underlying data in 
the composite indicators are selected based on broad coverage of current economic activity 
and as leading indicators of future real activity. Indicators include, for instance, activity at the 
early stages of production, factory orders, construction permits, measures of business 
confidence, and the like. The vector 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 is defined: 
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
3 = �𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴5,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒
𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡 �. 
Figure 13 shows the impulse responses of one-, three- and 10-year nominal yields to a 
one standard deviation structural shock to each of the three indicators.  
Figure 13. Impulse responses 
 
The impulse responses indicate that higher expected growth in the EU and Asia raise 
U.S. nominal interest rates and that the effects are quite persistent. The EU indicator is 
especially important for shifting short rates.  Higher expected consumption in the U.S. raises 
short rates more than long rates, but the impulse response is small overall. The indicators are 
jointly significant with a 𝑃𝑃 −value of 1.4 ∙ 10−5.  
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Figure 14. Variance decomposition for 𝑭𝑭𝒕𝒕𝟑𝟑 indicators. 
 
Figure 14 shows the variance decomposition. The EU indicator is dominant, especially 
at the short end of the yield curve, where it explains about 40% of the variance; the indicator 
for Asian economic activity explains about 20% of the variance at maturities of four to 10 
years. Overall, the set 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡3 with international variables explains a bit less variance in yields than 
the set 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡2. The presence of 𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  seems to reduce the ability of 𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡 to explain yield variance. 
This is perhaps because the correlation between the two is 0.41. 
To summarize, three indicators, 𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡−4, 𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  and 𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴5,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒   — all related to growth in output 
— emerge as reasonable candidates for explaining the variance of interest rates. The triple of 
economic indicators 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡2 accounts for between 60 and 75% of yield variance at the short end of 
the yield curve, and between 30 and 50% of variance at the long end. These results are 
broadly consistent with Ang and Piazzesi (2003) who find that macroeconomic variables can 
account for a large portion of variance in yields, especially at the short end of the yield curve.  
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Figure 15. Out-of-sample forecasting with domestic indicators. 
4.3.3 Comparisons of forecasting performance 
Previous research demonstrated that changes in the level component of yields are not 
forecastable in a yields-only model (e.g., Duffee 2013). As discussed in the Section 3review of 
the literature on methods for forecasting interest rates, it remains an open question whether 
macroeconomic variables improve forecasts of interest rates once the information from yields 
is fully taken into account. We have found that there is a connection between macroeconomic 
variables and interest rate dynamics in sample. We now ask whether the addition of domestic 
and international variables improves the forecast out of sample. Accordingly, we use a six-
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factor macrofinance model that includes three principal components of yields and three 
additional macroeconomic indicators. We compare out-of-sample forecasting properties 
among the yields-only model (that is, a special case of (5) with Λ = 0), the macrofinance model 
with domestic macroeconomic indicators (𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡2) and the macrofinance model with both global 
and domestic indicators (𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡3). Because most of the yield variation is captured by the first 
principal component, our comparisons focus on the models’ ability to predict the level 
component of yields, 𝑋𝑋1,𝑡𝑡. For consistency, we estimate each of the three models using the 
1990:Q2 to 2007:Q4 period, a subsample that includes the period prior to the great financial 
crisis. We show that the extended model can sometimes track the interest rate’s falling 
trajectory much better than a yields-only model. 
Without loss of generality, let 𝑡𝑡 = 0 denote the end of our sample period. To forecast the 
time path for 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 using solely the information on the history of realizations of economic 
indicators 𝐹𝐹1, … ,𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡, set 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 = 0 for all 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 and iterate equation (5) forward from the initial 
condition 𝑋𝑋0 taken from the data. In other words, we calculate a conditional expectation 
 𝑋𝑋�𝑡𝑡 = 𝔼𝔼(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡|𝑋𝑋0,𝐹𝐹1, … ,𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡). (7) 
In the yields-only model, the forecast of 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 is 𝔼𝔼(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡|𝑋𝑋0). In the macrofinance model, by 
contrast, the forecast of 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 is updated each period, using the most recent observation in 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡.  
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Figures 15 and 16 compare the resulting trajectories for predicted yields. To isolate the 
impact of model specification on the level component of yields, the figures depict yields 
predicted with just the first principal component, according to 
 𝑦𝑦�𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 + 𝑏𝑏1,𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋�1,𝑡𝑡 (8) 
instead of using all three components, as in equation (4).11  
The interest rate forecast from the yields-only model (depicted by the orange line on the 
figures) based on information available at the end of 2007 shows the 10-year nominal rate 
gradually rising from 4.3% in 2008 to about 5.8% by 2019. The rising forecast trajectory looks 
similar to Blue Chip interest rate forecasts depicted on Figure 4.  
Comparing Figures 15 and 16, we can see that forecasting performance changes 
substantially depending on the set of macroeconomic indicators. The specification of the 
macrofinance model with economic indicators, 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡2, that includes U.S. labor productivity growth 
and the weighted averages of forecasted and past year’s consumption growth and inflation not 
only fails to capture the falling trajectory for the interest rate after 2008, but also does worse 
than the yield only model.12 We think that this may have to do with the (wrong) sign for the 
coefficient on inflation in the first row of the estimated Λ matrix in (5). Since inflation after the 
global financial crisis was generally below average, the model’s forecast for the interest rate 
would tend to be high. By contrast, the macrofinance model with EU and Asia-5 leading 
                                               
11 Given our regression results in Table 4, one should not expect information contained in 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 to produce 
high-quality forecasts of the second and third principal components. The estimates of the dynamic 
model bear this out. Forecasts of 𝑋𝑋�2,𝑡𝑡, 𝑋𝑋�3,𝑡𝑡 from (6) are, in fact, volatile, and so are predicted yields 
calculated from (4). 
12 The interest rate level component forecasted with 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡1 indicators is qualitatively similar to that depicted 
on Figure 15 – the expected interest rate trajectory is higher than that from the yields-only model. 
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indicators tracks the interest rate levels much better out-of-sample. It seems that information 
contained in the OECD regional leading indicators is relevant for predicting interest rate levels.  
It is not entirely clear why the macrofinance model with global factors tracks the level 
component of yields better than the model with domestic factors. One hypothesis may be that 
domestic macroeconomic conditions are priced into yields to a larger extent than global 
conditions. If true, the coefficients of the matrix Λ will not fully capture the links between 
domestic macroeconomic conditions and yields, as some of that information could already be 
encoded into the principal components 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡. Our out-of-sample forecasting exercise does not 
use out-of-sample information on 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 but it does use the out-of-sample information on 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. By 
contrast, if global macroeconomic indicators are priced into yields to a smaller extent, the 
model would capture less feedback between the global indicators in 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 and the principal 
components.  
Another hypothesis may be a regime change with respect to inflation after the global 
financial crisis, which would make a stationary VAR an inappropriate model of yield dynamics, 
especially when inflation-related variables are included in the state vector 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. 
To summarize, the comparison exercise in this section illustrates that global 
macroeconomic indicators hold some promise in forecasting interest rates out of sample. Our 
preliminary analysis suggests that information about expected growth in other large economies 
has relevance in explaining U.S. interest rate shifts. 
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Figure 16. Out-of-sample forecasting with global and domestic indicators. 
4.3.4 Forecasting international yields 
Given our finding that information from international markets has an impact on U.S. 
interest rate dynamics, it is natural to ask whether global economic indicators are significant for 
the dynamics of other countries’ yields as well. To answer this question, we construct country-
specific sets of principal components of yields for Germany, U.K., and Canada and re-estimate 
the dynamic model of Section 4.3. We perform the estimation separately for each country 
using a country-specific series for 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 and a common series for global economic indicators, 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡4. 
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We evaluate the relevance of global indicators for foreign countries’ yield dynamics with 
variance decompositions similar to those shown on Figures 15 and 16. 
For consistency, the set 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡4 = �𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 ,𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴5,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 ,𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 �′ includes only OECD-sourced 
composite leading indicators for the EU, Asia-5, and the U.S. The results from the variance 
decomposition are generally encouraging, and they are broadly similar to those presented in 
Figure 14. One regularity is that the EU indicator well explains yield variances at the short end 
of the yield curve. This result appears robust across countries and subsamples. The portion of 
short rate variance that the EU indicator explains varies significantly by country: This portion is 
30 to 50% for the U.S., 30 to 60% for Germany and the U.K. and only 10 to 30% for Canada. 
The Asia-5 indicator, by contrast, explains the largest portion of the variance at the longer end 
of the yield curve, however, its ability to pick up yield variance depends on the estimation 
subsample. The Asia-5 indicator appears to be much more relevant in the pre-great financial 
crisis subsample, 1990:Q2 to 2007:Q4. We think that this is because the correlation between 
the EU and Asia-5 indicators increased after 2008, suggesting that the two no longer contain 
as much distinct information over the later segment of the sample. For similar reasons, the 
U.S. composite leading indicator does not explain much of yield variance in any of the four 
countries. This may be because of its high correlation with the EU indicator, which is 0.73 over 
the full sample. 
To summarize, global economic indicators, especially the composite leading indicator 
for the EU, are capable of accounting for a large portion of yield variance not only in the U.S. 
but in other advanced economies as well. Changes in global real activity, as captured by three 
composite leading indicators, account for most of the variance in the short rates and a 
somewhat smaller portion of the variance in long rates. 
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5. Conclusion 
The goal of this paper is two-fold: first to provide a synthesis of methodologies for 
constructing long-range interest rate projections and second, to examine the role of domestic 
and global macroeconomic variables in forecasting U.S. interest rates.  
This paper reviewed a number of methodologies for constructing long-range interest 
rate projections. Traditional statistical forecasting models based on stationary VAR dynamics 
face some limitations in their ability to capture low-frequency movements in interest rates, at 
least with available sample lengths of 150 quarters or so. Several other methodologies for 
long-range interest rate projections  ̶  particularly, those that can make use of long time series  ̶  
may complement the insights from forecasting models. 
Two methodologies are potentially useful for constructing long-range interest rate 
projections: semistructural methods of interest rate trend decomposition and standard 
statistical forecasting models with an extended set of explanatory variables, including forward-
looking economic indicators. These methodologies use different data and samples, and they 
provide complementary pieces of information. Moreover, interest rate trend decompositions 
are potentially informative on the state variables set that may be included in a VAR-based 
forecasting model. 
We perform a decomposition of the long-run nominal interest rate over the period 1981 
to 2019 under the assumption that, in the long-run, inflation has no effect on the real interest 
rate. Three variables, the earnings-price ratio of the stock market, the weighted average of 
past and forecasted consumption growth, and year-on-year productivity growth explain 87% of 
variation in the 10-year real rate. The relative importance of the various macroeconomic 
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determinants changes over time, with the earnings-price ratio mattering most in the 1981 to 
1988 period and consumption growth most significant following recessions. 
Our reduced-form decomposition and interpretation of results in Del Negro et al. (2018) 
and Gourinchas and Rey (2019) suggest global macroeconomic variables as well as forward-
looking indicators as good candidates for the expanded set of explanatory variables in a 
forecasting model. An important and unresolved question in the literature is whether 
macroeconomic-conditions information improves the forecast for interest rates, or whether past 
yield information is sufficient to fully characterize interest rate dynamics. We add to this debate 
by exploring the role of domestic and international macroeconomic variables for interest rate 
forecasting. We find that international variables are increasingly important for understanding 
and predicting U.S. interest rates. 
To assess the forecasting performance of global and domestic indicators, we estimate a 
macrofinance affine term structure model. This method allows us to ask whether 
macroeconomic variables add information after conditioning on past information about yields 
captured by the principal components. Our estimates show there is little information in the 
earnings-price ratio beyond what is already encoded in the principal components of yields. In 
contrast, U.S. consumption growth and productivity growth play distinct roles in explaining the 
variance of yields, with consumption growth being most important for short-term rates, and 
productivity growth for both short- and long-term rates. We find that growth indicators for 
Europe and Asia are strongly significant, supporting our view that international factors are 
increasingly important for U.S. interest rate determination. 
An important contribution of our work is the addition to the forecast of international, 
forward-looking indicators. We compare the out-of-sample forecasting properties of the 
52 
dynamic model under three specifications: a yields-only model, a macrofinance model with 
domestic macroeconomic indicators, and a macrofinance model both domestic and 
international indicators. We find that the model with international factors can outperform the 
other models by better tracking the falling trajectory of U.S. interest rates in the post-2008 
period, a trend that is missed by domestic variables. Further, we find that global economic 
indicators, especially the composite leading indicator for the EU, are capable of accounting for 
a large portion of yield variance not only in the U.S. but in other advanced economies as well. 
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